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Last, the court considered whether Reclamation's analysis of alternatives to the project was sufficient to comply with NEPA. The court noted
that Reclamation had been working with Ecology throughout the entire
project development process. Ecology's EIS considered and rejected five
alternatives to the project and Reclamation referenced Ecology's EIS in
its EA. The court ultimately held that because another document related
to the same project had already considered the alternatives, the EA did
not have to again evaluate those same alternatives. Therefore, the court
held the alternatives discussed in Reclamation's EA complied with
NEPA.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Reclamation.

Alan Kitchen

STATE COURTS
COLORADO
Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist., 266 P.3d 401
(Colo. 2011) (en banc) (holding that a municipal service provider's protectable and unique interest in its right to reuse return flows from a
wastewater treatment plant would be impaired if the provider were prohibited to intervene in prior litigation).
Cherokee Metropolitan District ("Cherokee") and Meridian Service
Metropolitan District ("Meridian") are government bodies that provide
water to residents and landowners within their boundaries. Upper Black
Squirrel Creek Ground Water Management District ("UBS") is a government body that manages ground water withdrawals from the Upper
Black Squirrel Creek* designated ground water basin ("UBS basin") from which Cherokee and Meridian both source water. In 1998, Cherokee and UBS began litigation over Cherokee's water rights in the UBS
basin. The parties settled and entered a Stipulation and Release whereby
Cherokee was required to deliver certain wastewater returns back into the
UBS basin for recharge of the aquifer.
In 2003, Cherokee and Meridian entered into an intergovernmental
agreement ("IGA") to build a new wastewater treatment facility to treat
wastewater from both Cherokee and Meridian and return the water back
into the UBS basin. In 2008, Cherokee and Meridian applied for a replacement plan with the Colorado Ground Water Commission ("Conmission") to obtain replacement credit for the return flows from the
wastewater treatment facility into the UBS basin. UBS filed a statement
of objection with the Commission and a motion to dismiss the replacement plan, which the Commission denied. UBS then filed motions for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
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In 2010, Meridian moved to intervene as of right to challenge both
the declaratory judgment and injunction motions. Meridian argued that
the motions directly affected its water rights in both the replacement plan
and the IGA, and that intervention was the only way it could protect
those rights. The Water Court Division 2 ("water court") denied Meridian's request for intervention because it was not a party to the 1999 Stipulation between UBS and Cherokee. The water court further noted that
UBS had no contractual obligations to Meridian, and that Meridian's
proper recourse was instead to hold Cherokee accountable for its obligations under the IGA. While Meridian's appeal was pending, the water
court granted UBS's motion for declaratory judgment.
The Supreme Court of Colorado addressed two issues on appeal.
First, it reviewed the water court's denial of Meridian's motion to intervene. Second, it reviewed the water court's grant of declaratory relief
while Meridian's appeal of its motion to intervene was pending.
Meridian sought to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the statute, a party seeking intervention
must satisfy three distinct components: interest, impairment, and inadequate representation. The court analyzed these three components in
turn. Under the first part of the statute, Meridian claimed an interest in
maintaining its right to reuse the return flows from the wastewater treatment plant by way of a share of the additional water diverted from the
UBS basin under the replacement plan. The court noted that Meridian's
interest related to the subject matter of the underlying declaratory judgment action because UBS sought an injunction against Cherokee "or any
other person" from claiming wastewater returns as replacement credit. In
addition, an injunction could effectively estop Meridian from moving
forward with its replacement plan application. Although UBS argued that
Meridian was not a party to the Stipulation and therefore did not have a
valid interest in the matter, the court found that Meridian satisfied the
first part of the statute.
Under the second part of the statute requiring impairment, the court
reasoned that the declaratory judgment action could have, as a practical
matter, impaired Meridian's ability to protect its rights to reuse return
flows from the wastewater treatment plant. The court noted that a favorable ruling for UBS could potentially preclude Meridian from reusing
return flows for replacement credit, and that Meridian would have no
option to opt out of the judgment or bring an independent challenge to
the water court's interpretation of the Stipulation. Thus, the court determined that Meridian satisfied the second part of the statute.
Under the third part of the statute, the court found that Meridian's
interest in protecting its rights to reuse the return flows from the wastewater treatment plant was similar, but not identical, to Cherokee's interest.
Furthermore, the court outlined specific reasons why Cherokee might not
adequately represent Meridian's interests, including: Cherokee's own
statements that it would not do so; the fact that Cherokee and Meridian
may be involved in future litigation over the IGA; and that resolution of
the declaratory judgment action might put Cherokee's interests in direct
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conflict with Meridian's. Consequently, the court found that Meridian
satisfied the third part of the statute.
Because Meridian satisfied all three parts of the statute, the court
held that Meridian had a right to intervene and reversed the water court's
denial of Meridian's motion to intervene.
The court then addressed the water court's grant of declaratory relief
for UBS while Meridian's appeal of its motion to intervene was pending.
Because the court found that Meridian did have a right to participate in

the declaratory judgment proceedings, the court held that the proceedings
must be reopened to give Meridian an opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, the court vacated the grant of declaratory relief for UBS and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its holding.
Darn Smith

LoPresti v. Brandenburg, No. 10SA191, 2011 WL 6147058 (Colo.
Dec. 12, 2011) (en banc) (holding that a rotational no-call agreement is
valid under Colorado law if the agreement does not sanction a change in
water rights).
This case involved the appeal of an order issued by the Colorado
District Court for Water Division No. 2 ("water court") voiding a rotational no-call water right agreement on Alvarado Creek in Custer County.
At issue were four separate water rights ("Four Ditches") originally adjudicated in 1896 along Alvarado Creek. In 1908, the owner of three of
these rights entered into a settlement decree with the owner of a single
right. This decree, known as the Beardsley Decree, stated that, every
fourth day, the owner of the single right could use or divert water from
the stream from any point for any lawful use.
The LoPrestis, the current owners of three of the rights, filed an application in 1996 to change these rights on Alvarado Creek, which Brandenburg and others opposed. In 2000, the water court, by summary
judgment, declared the Beardsley Decree void because the consequent
changes in the diversion points, when compared to the decree, were not
in accord with notice provisions effective in 1908. In 2011, Brandenburg
resurrected the case because the water court had not resolved the LoPrestis' original 1996 application for change in water rights. The water court
granted Brandenburg's Rule 54(b) motion and certified the case for immediate appeal of the Beardsley Decree order. The Supreme Court of
Colorado ("Court") reviewed the water court's decision de novo on two
separate issues: the legal conclusion reached on the summary judgment
motion; and the water court's interpretation of the decree as a contract.
Brandenburg first argued that the Beardsley Decree language permitted the LoPrestis to choose points along Alvarado Creek for the diversion
of water when they were in priority, thereby effecting an illegal change of
water rights, and that summary judgment was therefore appropriate. The
Court disagreed with this argument and looked at the entire language of
the decree to interpret the terms Brandenburg questioned. The term "all

